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Abstract - Since the 50s, the central idea in the Fisheries 
Economics is that, in conditions of free access and 
competition, the market will lead to market equilibrium 
solutions that imply the overexploitation of the 
resources. This fundamental result is due to Scott 
Gordon in his seminal article of 1954, “The Economic 
Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery”, 
in the Journal of Political Economy.  
But, in fact, another (more antique) article put the 
problem and suggested this approach to its 
understanding: In a short paper, in 1911 (exactly 100 
years ago), the Danish economist Jens Warming, put 
this issue and made a very similar analysis for the 
fisheries sector.   
The purpose of this research is to make a reflection on 
that paper and highlight the explanation proposed for 
the common property problem and, also, to study the 
legacy of this interesting fisheries economist to the 
History of Political Economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The origins of modern Fisheries Economics can 
be traced back in the 50s with the papers of Gordon 
(1954), Scott (1955) and Schaefer (1957). 
In his seminal paper “The Economic Theory of a 
Common Property Resource: The Fishery”, Gordon 
argued that, in a situation of open access and 
competition, the market would not lead to the most 
efficient solution in resource use. The common 
property nature of fish resources implied that, in an 
unregulated fishery, the result would be the 
expansion of the industry to a point of economic, 
even biological, overfishing. 
But, in fact, there is another, more antique, 
article that put the problem and suggested this 
approach to its understanding. In an article from 1911 
(exactly 100 years ago), the Danish economist, Jens 
Warming discussed this issue and made a similar 
analysis, for the fisheries sector.   
The purpose of this research is to make a 
reflection on that paper and highlight the proposed 
explanation for the common property problem.  The 
paper studies the legacy of this interesting fisheries 
economist to the History of Economic Thought and 
ask what went wrong and why did the important 
achievements of Warming’s research had not the 
justified academic applause and practical impact.  
2. Notes on Jens Warming Life and 
Career  
Jens Warming’s family belonged to the 
intellectual elite of Denmark. His father, Eugene 
Warming, was an important and influential professor 
of Botany in the University of Copenhagen and his 
contributions on Ecology were internationally 
recognized.  
Jens Warming (1873-1939) was graduated in 
Law, in 1897, in the University of Copenhagen, and 
then went to the USA where he worked, teaching in a 
Danish school, in Nebraska. After his return to 
Denmark, he made a special master degree in 
Economics. This degree was usually given to lawyers 
who wanted to pursuit a career in the administration.  
Warming went on pursuing a remarkable career 
in the Danish Central Department of Statistics (1904-
1919). He was not a “genuine economist” (Topp, 
2008) but, at the same time, he went on being a part-
time professor of Economics and Descriptive 
Statistics in the Danish Agricultural University and in 
the University of Copenhagen.  
This lack of formal graduation in Economics 
gave him some bitter problems. He was frequently 
criticized for insufficient knowledge of Economic 
Theory and when he finally got a permanent tenure in 
the University was in Statistics, never getting the 
desired chair of Economics. Even his mentor, Harald 
Westergaard, leader professor in Economics in the 
University of Copenhagen, seemed not to understand 
the relevance of his work. 
Jens Warming tried to get the tenure in 
Economics for two times but, in the first, it was 
another (later) well known Danish economist to be 
chosen - L. Birch, and in the second time, it was his 
previous student, Axel Nielsen, who got the 
professorship in Economics.  
The personal animosity played an important role 
but it was, perhaps, his proactive attitude towards 
government regulation and intervention at the 
microeconomic level (that was not in accordance 
with the mainstream view of the 20s that the 
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deregulation was required) that gave him some 
objections in the academic playground (Topp, 2008). 
His fundamental work rested in the Descriptive 
Statistics. In 1929, Warming published a textbook on 
Danish statistics with an applied economic 
perspective. For more than a decade, his book of 
Denmark characterization was extensively used by 
Danish economics students. Teaching economic 
theory was not, of course, his task, but in his statistics 
textbooks he went on partly disregarding that, making 
several critiques on mainstream economics and 
including his theoretical contributions, as it is the 
case of fisheries. 
He also tried, from 1921, to write a textbook in 
Economics but it was never published because of the 
dispute between a professor of statistics and the 
professor of economics in the Copenhagen 
University. 
After the flaw of getting the desired tenure in 
Denmark he went on trying to get applause, 
externally. In 1926, he submitted a 230 pages essay 
to an international competition on the Theory of 
Wages. He did not win the competition but he had an 
“honourable mention” and the recognition from 
foreign colleagues that made him to pursuit his 
efforts in the economic area, finally publishing a 
paper in the esteemed Economic Journal.  
His ability in recognizing and applying the 
marginalist revolution was evident and his 
developments in the area of wages and rents rested 
upon the most recent developments in Economics. 
The paper he published in the Economic Journal, 
made an interesting presentation of the multiplier (see 
Topp (1981) on the link between Keynes theory and 
Warming’s research). He also made important 
seminal references about the problem of 
identification in econometric analysis.  
His work has only a few references (Wicksell 
and Marshall are the most cited; but also Fisher and 
Germanic authors, especially about the quantitative 
theory of money). 
Another interesting fact of his career relates with 
the links with marine biologists.  
Along the period of his research career the 
current situation in the sector of fisheries went on 
some important changes.  
In 1883, Thomas Huxley said that probably all 
the great fisheries were inexhaustible but at the end 
of the 19
th
 century this leading fisheries biologist 
(working in the northern Europe at the time) started 
to worry about the decline of fish stocks in the Baltic 
Sea and in the North Atlantic (see Eggert (2010)). 
That laid to the formation of the ICES (International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea) in 1902. With 
headquarters in Copenhagen, ICES pretended to be a 
forum of multidisciplinary discussion on practical 
fisheries problems.  
Focus was still on Biology. Only in the fifties, 
the modern Economics of Fisheries (with the research 
of Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955)) and the modern 
Fisheries Biology (with the studies of Schaefer 
(1957) and Beverton and Holt (1957)) evolved. Jens 
Warming tried to communicate with Marine 
biologists and to present his vision about the 
relevance of Economics in the treatment of the 
problem. He sent his papers to important researchers 
in this area (H. Kyle, Petersen and Hjort are most 
cited in Warming’s notebook). Even for the Danish 
prime minister, former fisheries minister, but with 
few results. 
3. The Legacy of J. Warming  
There are significant aspects of Warming’s 
legacy in Economics. Our approach highlights his 
contribution in the fisheries area and the innovative 
way he treats the problem of common property.  
Since the seminal paper of Gordon (1954) the 
fundamental idea in Fisheries Economics is that the 
market will not lead to optimal exploitation of the 
resources. The common property nature of fisheries 
and the presence of externalities in the process of 
capture will lead to market equilibrium solutions that 
imply the overexploitation of the resources and the 
overcapacity in the industry – the “Tragedy of the 
Commons”, using Hardin’s  (1968) metaphor. 
Forty three years before the publication of 
Gordon’s seminal paper, Warming made an 
important investigation about the problems of open 
access in the allocation of a common-property 
resource and presented his results in a short article 
“Om Grundrente af Fiskegrunde” (“On Land-rent of 
Fishing Grounds”), published in the Journal of the 
Danish Economic Association. 
After this article of 1911, he made several 
references of his results in two unpublished books: a 
textbook from 1921 and another 1926 manuscript. 
This manuscript, which was intended for an 
international audience, includes an English new 
version of his 1911 model and became the main 
ingredient of a second article on fisheries, in 1931. 
This model was also the centre of the sections on 
fisheries included in his textbooks from 1929 and 
1938 (revised edition) about the socio-economic 
conditions in Denmark. 
3.1. “On rent of Fishing Grounds”: open access 
and rent dissipation 
In his most cited article, Warming compared the 
rent available from fishing grounds and land. Land is, 
in the most part, in private hands and land rents are a 
privilege of private landowners, whereas fishing 
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grounds are not privately owned but are considered 
common property.  However, the differences do not 
change the basic economics of both forms of 
management. Warming stated that the common 
property nature of open access to fishing grounds 
without charges tends to decrease the rent and he 
proposed to alleviate this through transferable fishing 
licences. 
To summarize the contribution of this first 
article:  
The core idea reflected the marginal revolution. 
In a competitive economy a worker earns a wage 
equal to the value of his marginal product. But, 
according to Warming, there were examples in the 
economy where this did not hold. One of these 
exceptions was the case of the fisheries where the 
problems occurred due to a “lacks in the organization 
of society”.  
These exceptions did not question the theory of 
marginal productivity as a general fundament but 
there were situations where these exceptions had 
practical relevance. Under open access, the potential 
rent in a fishery is dissipated. As no one has property 
rights over the resource and there is no possibility of 
exclusion, the constant entrance of a newcomer in the 
fishery will not cess until the difference between 
revenues and costs are zero, that is, until all the rents 
are dissipated.  
Biological regulation, as closed seasons or mesh 
size specification, can prevent the biological 
overexploitation of resources but not the economic 
over-exploitation. Even the use of licences with the 
objective of maximizing maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY) would not maximize the total rents. In fact, 
the “economic optimum” level of fishing effort is in 
the point where marginal revenue equals the marginal 
cost. That is, the economic optimum stands at a level 
equivalent to the monopoly case. Anthony Scott 
would refer this, in 1955, as the “sole owner” 
situation, which is now commonly recognized as the 
one that guaranties the maximum economic yield 
(MEY).  
He also pointed out that a tax, equal to the 
difference between average and marginal revenue at 
the optimal level, will lead to an optimal fishery. This 
idea is also very interesting, clearly reminding the 
proposals of Pigou, in the 20s, to internalize the 
external effects. 
We note that these results are very close with 
those of Gordon and Scott in the fifties.  
Of course, as Topp (2008) points out, even if the 
theoretical fundaments and arguments are the same, 
the articles are very different with respect to scope 
and composition and perhaps that explains the 
different forms they were seen and used by the 
academic community. The Gordon article was 
directly focused on Fisheries Economics and resulted 
from a program of investigation which, at the time, 
tried to apply the economic theory to fisheries 
contemporary programs. This article was published in 
a highly considered journal (The Journal of Political 
Economy) and when there was a group of researchers 
very interested in the results of public regulation in 
this area.  
Warming’s findings reflects his study about the flaw 
of competitive market. It did not deal with 
contemporary and international debate on regulation. 
However, it contains important elements of fisheries 
management that had no explicit reference in 
Gordon’s article. Perhaps for economists this debate 
did not seem very important but that would have been 
important for biologists and executives. A very 
interesting example is the concept of MSY. 
3.2.  “The Danish Right to Eel Weir”: Rights 
based Management 
In his first article, Warming did not elaborate 
much regarding the implications, in practical terms, 
of his proposals. The basic guidelines of thought 
were that a free market economy did not 
automatically lead to optimality and that government 
regulations were needed. The suspicion about the 
“invisible hand” was a recurrence in his work. 
Twenty years later, in 1931, he published another 
article going into new details and presenting a 
graphical presentation to explain his findings: 
 
 
The returns from fisheries are shown in the 
vertical axis, whereas in the horizontal axis we have 
the fishing effort measured by the number of 
fishermen. 
The curve QF shows the diminishing returns as 
the fishing effort increases. The line PD represents 
the marginal cost.  
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In this context, total benefits are maximized 
when the number of fishermen is OA, and the total 
income of fishermen is the area OABP.  
Warming compares fishing with farming and 
states that the number of workers hired by a profit 
maximizing farmer will be such that the last worker 
hired produces as much as he receives in wages.  
The total income from fishing is, in fact, OABQ. 
So, the value PBQ is the sea rent for access to the 
resource on the fishing grounds. If no one collects 
this sea rent and fishing is free, the average income of 
OA fishermen will be higher than AB and, as this 
rent is divided among fishermen, their mean income 
rests AT, that is, the median height of OABQ, so the 
value RSQ is equal to the value STB.  
Of course, high average profit draws more 
people into fishing. Equilibrium is achieved where 
fishing effort is OC and total income is equal to the 
total cost of fishing: so, PBQ=BED.  The additional 
fishermen produce only ACEB and could produce 
more in some other pursuit. They only receive the 
required ordinary income by having PBQ added to 
their production. The sea rent is wasted in the sense 
that it subsidizes the income of extra fishermen 
whose production do not correspond to their wages. 
Finally, he maintains that in order to prevent that 
the number of fishermen goes up to OA, fees should 
be collected for the licences. A private owner  (or a 
government agency) would collect such fees and the 
fee ought to be BT, to result in the optimal number of 
people in the fishing activity. This would provide 
PBTR in the form of fees.  
He introduces some additional features: A right 
for the coastal owner to charge a fee for this fishing 
right in the areas near the coast implied a regulating 
effect that corresponds to the property right of land. 
The right of the owner to regulate the entry prevents 
the excess of fishing effort and maximizes the rent 
guaranteeing the optimal number of fishers. 
Warming also stated that free access can lead 
even to a negative marginal product implying the 
utilization of immature stocks. So, even in times of 
high unemployment (and that was the case in the 30s) 
it was better to keep away from fishing the 
superfluous fishers.  
We note that this article was also a response to a 
specific situation in the context of Denmark fisheries. 
In fact, Danish fishers demanded, at the time, that the 
“Right to Eel Weir” should be abolished.  
This right to eel weir was an exception from the 
freedom of access that was the general rule in Danish 
fisheries. According to the Danish Fisheries Act 
(from the end of the XIX century) no one could be 
excluded “from a properly visited and marked fishing 
ground”. But there was an exception. Traditional 
Danish Law granted shorefront owners the right to set 
eel traps in the sea adjacent to their land property and 
property owners were entitled to charge fishers for 
permission to set traps in some of this specified 
offshore areas.  
In one of their annual Assemblies, the Danish 
Fishing Association proposed to abolish private eels 
trapping rights with unanimity. Warming’s article 
was a protest against this change in governance. 
Warming opposed the introduction of free access to 
replace rental fishing in the limited area in which the 
latter had applied. He argued that this would lead to 
the total dissipation of rent. 
So, his article was derived from a political debate 
on whether to abolish the legal title of the owners of 
the foreshores to restrict the access and to impose 
fees on those granted permission. Warming was in 
favor of maintaining the existing system: his 
argument was that it produced the optimal regulation 
result. Instead of abolishing this system, he proposed 
that it was a benefit to introduce a similar system in 
all sea governance (although it seemed to Warming 
that was impractical because of the dimension of the 
transaction costs - negotiation and control, involved). 
The debate, in 1931, faded away, leaving the law 
unchanged but when the debate was revived, in 1955, 
the economic arguments of Warming remained 
ignored and the Danish parliament abolished the right 
in 1956 (Gislason, 1995). Private rights of shorefront 
owners to set eel traps adjacent to their property were 
abolished and the owners were compensated for this 
loss of privilege. 
We must also note that his clear opposition to 
maintain extra-workers in fishery, appealing to the 
economic efficiency in the sector, could not be well 
accepted at the time.  
In the 30s, Great Depression was at higher level 
in Denmark. But (still) Warming argues strongly 
against using employment in fisheries as an 
alternative in recession days, because extra fishers 
will impose an extra-external cost to the other 
fishermen, dissipating the potential rent. And he 
added another problem: the typical inertia in this 
sector where socio-professional mobility is difficult. 
After entering, the superfluous fishers will not move 
fast enough for more productive sectors when the 
recession is over.  
4. Conclusions  
It’s not easy to make a balance of the relevance 
of Warning’s work to Political Economy, but we can 
summarise the achievements and ask what went 
wrong in his trajectory. 
The fundamental achievements were: 
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A. The central idea that relates the open access with 
the dissipation of rent and its corollaries: 
 the market failure resulting from insufficient 
specification of property rights,  
 the overexploitation and overcapacity 
resulting from these specific conditions of 
market operation,  
 necessity of public regulation, including 
some kind of rights based management to 
mitigate the market inefficient allocation.  
B. His previous comments on regulation methods to 
internalise the external costs associated with the 
capture process: 
 the fees from licences, in a sense that 
reminds the pigouvian taxes, 
 the presentation of licences and other forms 
of property rights as possible tools for sea 
governance and fisheries management, that 
reminds the Coasian solutions. 
 
What went wrong? Why did important 
achievements have not the justified academic 
applause and practical impact? 
First, there are some difficulties of academic 
nature.  
The fact that his article on fisheries was 
published in a Danish journal and in the original 
language of the author was a significant factor for its 
weak disclosure. Only in the 80s, an English 
translation of the seminal article of 1911, by an 
important fisheries economist, P. Andersen, and a 
study from Hannesson and Anderson (1981) on the 
contribution of Warming, gave the relevance that 
Warming’s legacy deserved.  
However, is to be noted that, in the 50s, during a 
round table, promoted by FAO, to discuss the 
advances in Fisheries Economics, one of Warning’s 
former Icelandic students (O. Bjornsson) called the 
attention to the work of Warming and made an 
English presentation of his model. 
Last year, 2010, the journal History of Political 
Economy published an English version of his article 
from 1931, translated by H. Eggert.  
Note that the personal animosity and suspicion in 
the academic circuit that we referred in the beginning, 
made difficult his task. Also, some singular 
idiosyncratic aspects, as the one of not including 
extensive bibliographical references, were not 
conform the usual “correct policy” in academic 
context. 
Second, we must note that his findings and 
recommendations were not in line with the 
mainstream.  
A lot of his results were indeed interesting in 
practical terms for fisheries regulation, but derived 
from an economic analysis. That economic 
perspective had no impact on the decision-makers of 
fisheries management. In fact, only in the 60s and 70s 
the Economics of Fisheries went on being really 
considered. Until the Second World War the 
management of fisheries were only administrative 
and the focus (and the decisions) came exclusively 
from Biology. 
Even for economists it seems that his results 
were always in the opposite side of the mainstream. 
He proposed a regulation approach where economists 
and the fishers associations proposed more 
liberalisation. He proposed the creation or, at least, 
maintaining the existing property rights when 
everyone defended the free access.  
But, at the same time, he was against the use of 
fisheries as a sector to absorb the unemployment 
resulting from Depression. That is, his defence of 
economic efficiency and sustainability of the sector 
put him in the unpleasant role. It seems that he was 
always on the “wild side of the street”. 
Note also that there is a miss in his work. In fact, 
what is missing is the description of the dynamic 
nature of the problem of fisheries management that 
went, in the early 70s, to solve the model by applying 
a capital theoretic framework (that gave to the 
Fisheries Economics research a real “gold period”). 
Finally, note that his ideas have, nowadays, even 
if his name is not cited, a real relevance.  
His preoccupation with superfluous workers in 
fisheries is now the subject of an important 
discussion on the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
reform (see Coelho et al, 2011). The CFP points to 
the necessity of making the balance between the 
social stability in the coastal areas mostly dependent 
on fishing, with the objective of getting sustainable 
fisheries (implicating a reduction in fishing effort to 
put it in line with the necessary renewal of the 
stocks). But these are contradictory objectives. To 
solve this equation is, perhaps, the major difficulty in 
the process of reform that is intended for 2012. And 
now, with the economic crisis and the high levels of 
unemployment in the E.U., it seems more difficult to 
ask for a reduction of capacity. 
Some problems (as the case of “quota hopping”) 
are creating the idea that a system of quotas and 
TACs are not enough to get sustainable fisheries. 
That is, the command and control instruments, that 
made the core of the conservation and management 
regime of the CFP, can have results in terms of 
biological over-exploitation but, as Warming 
defended, cannot solve the economic problem. This 
problem rests, basically, in its common property 
nature. The solution of the externalities associated 
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implies an economic analysis and the introduction of 
Rights Based Management methods. They are also in 
discussion in the next CFP reform. 
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